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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellant Edward Stevens submits the following in support of his Petition for Rehearing. 
Rehearing should be granted because the Court's ruling regarding the Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963), cause of action is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of that case 
and its progeny. The ruling is also based upon an unreasonable determination of fact based upon 
the record below. 
The Court resolved the Brady claim as follows: 
The district court denied this claim after an evidentiary hearing, finding, in relevant part, 
that Stevens "failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the eyes were removed 
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post-embalming." We need not address the district court's factual finding because an 
examination of the record indicates that this is not an instance where the prosecutor 
violated her responsibilities under Brady. Here, it is clear the mortuary report was not in 
the prosecutors' (or their agents') possession or control and could not be reasonably 
imputed to them. Rather, the funeral home (which was clearly not a State agent) had sole 
- possession of the report until well after the trial in 2003 when, responding to an inquiry 
from the investigator for the public defender's office, the prosecutor requested the funeral 
home's files and forwarded them to the investigator and defense counsel. 
In addition, even assuming the prosecutor or other members of the investigative team 
knew of the existence of the report and/or of the fact that the eyes were removed post-
embalming, the evidence is, on its face, devoid of indications that it was exculpatory. On 
the record we have before us, there is little to no basis upon which to conclude the 
prosecutor or other members of the investigative team would or should have had any 
reason to believe this fact constituted material exculpatory evidence, such that the 
evidence must be disclosed. The record indicates it was not until Stevens obtained the 
opinion of several experts during the post-conviction proceedings that any inkling arose 
indicating the evidence was potentially exculpatory. This is distinguishable from 
evidence that a prosecutor and/or the investigative team can be reasonably expected to 
discern as exculpatory-such as a witness's statement identifYing an alternate perpetrator 
than the defendant. Additional analysis, beyond the ken of the prosecutor and 
investigation team, was necessary in this case to reveal the exculpatory nature of the 
evidence in question. Under these circumstances, knowledge of the evidentiary 
significance of the embalming report and/or the timing of the removal of the child's eyes 
cannot reasonably be imputed to the prosecutor. 
Stevens v. State, --- Idaho ---, --- P.3d ---,2013 WL 6423426*5 (Ct. App. 2013). 
The Court, however, errs in four respects and rehearing should be granted to correct those 
errors. 
1. The embalming report is not the withheld evidence. 
First, it is not the embalming report which is the exculpatory evidence; it is the fact that 
the eyes were removed post-embalming. The report documents that the eyes were still present at 
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the time of the embalming, but it is the fact that the eyes were not removed at autopsy and not 
removed until after the embalming which is Brady evidence. Even if the embalming report did 
not exist, the prosecution team withheld Brady evidence because it was well aware that the eyes 
were not removed at the autopsy because the pathologist, coroner, deputy coroner and two sheriff 
deputies were present at the autopsy. In addition, someone from the prosecution team removed 
the eyes post-embalming, preserved them and arranged for them to be shipped to Dr. Crawford. 
2. The withheld evidence is exculpatory on its face. 
Second, the evidence of post-embalming removal is exculpatory on its face. While the 
Court asserts that "there is little to no basis to conclude the prosecutor or other members of the 
investigation team would or should have any reason to believe this fact constituted material 
exculpatory evidence," Stevens at 5, that is not so. To the contrary, the withheld evidence 
provides a common-sense reason why Dr. Kent did not observe macular folding when he 
examined the child's eyes at the hospital when Dr. Crawford observed the folds months later in 
his post-mortem examination. Two different observations of the same object can be explained in 
two ways: 1) one of the two observations is inaccurate or 2) the condition of the object has 
changed between the two observations. That is why car rental agencies have their renters inspect 
the car prior to leaving the lot so that any damage upon return can be attributed to the renter. 
The agency assures that the driver agrees upon the condition of the vehicle so that any change 
observed at the time of return can be attributed to a change in the vehicle's condition. Here, 
however, the jury could not know whether Dr. Kent did not observe the folds because they were 
not present or because his observations were inaccurate. The evidence of post-embalming 
removal, even without any expert testimony to explain the full importance of that fact, provided 
an easily understood explanation of why the condition of the eyes had changed. Further, Dr. 
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Slaughter testified that he consulted with two forensic pathologists and was told to remove the 
eyes at autopsy. (Petitioner's Exhibit D, Vol. II, p. 378, In. 1-14; Exhibit X, pg. 40, In. 3 - pg. 
41, In. 9.) Thus, at least one member of the prosecution team was aware of the importance of the 
post-embalming removal. 
The prosecution team withheld plainly exculpatory evidence when it did not reveal the 
fact that it did not remove the eyes until after embalming. It knew that Dr. Crawford was going 
to testify about the presence of macular folds. It knew that Dr. Kent did not see them. It also 
knew that the condition of the eyes had been altered by the embalming, even if it did not know 
all the ramifications of the embalming process. Thus, to conclude that the evidence was not 
plainly exculpatory is an unreasonable determination of the facts upon the record. 
3. The question of whether the prosecution team knew the evidence was exculpatory is 
irrelevant to the Brady analysis. 
The Court next errs by finding that the Brady rule does not apply when the state 
withholds evidence which it does not realize is exculpatory. 2013 WL 6423426*8, citing, 
People v. Kirkpatrick, 650 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. App. 1995). However, that conclusion is foreclosed 
by Brady itself. As this Court has written, "A defendant's due process rights are violated where 
the prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence that is material either to guilt or 
punishment, irrespective o/the good/aith or bad/aith a/the prosecution." State v. Ward, 135 
Idaho 68, 72, 14 P.3d 388, 392 (CL App. 2000), citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added). 
It does not matter if the prosecutor did not disclose due to its good-faith belief the evidence was 
not exculpatory. "Moreover, under Brady an inadvertent nondisclosure has the same impact on 
the fairness of the proceedings as deliberate concealment. 'If the suppression of evidence results 
in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the 
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prosecutor.'" Strickler, 527 U.S., at 288, quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 
(1976), overruled on other grounds in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
The reason why the good-faith of the prosecutor is not relevant is because Brady is 
intended to provide the defendant with a fair trial, not to punish the prosecutor. "The principle .. 
. is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to 
the accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are 
fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when the accused is treated unfairly." 
Brady, supra. That is why the prosecutor does not even need to be personally aware of the 
evidence for Brady to apply. "In order to comply with Brady, ... 'the individual prosecutor has 
a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf 
in this case[.]"') Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999), quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 
U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995). It does not matter if the prosecutor did not see the exculpatory value of 
the evidence if the withholding of that evidence deprived the defendant a fair trial, which is 
undoubtedly the case for Mr. Stevens. 
It is noteworthy that this Court is the only court to have ever cited People v. Kirkpatrick, 
for the proposition that the prosecutor must have some knowledge of the withheld evidence's 
exculpatory nature. Not only is that rule contrary to the text of Brady itself, the case relied upon 
by the Fitzpatrick Court, United States v. Moore, 25 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1994), does not support its 
conclusion. Moore did not involve a case where the prosecutor was aware of the evidence but 
did not recognize its exculpatory nature. The prosecutor in Moore was simply not aware of the 
evidence at all. 25 F.3d at 569. ("The district court held a hearing and determined, among other 
things, that the government did not have possession or knowledge of the information concerning 
5 • BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Ms. Jackson's prior conviction."). Moore has no application to a case where the prosecutor is 
aware ofthe evidence but not of its exculpatory nature. 
The Court has misapplied Brady by creating a new requirement that the defendant prove 
that the prosecutor knew or should have known of the exculpatory value of the withheld 
evidence. Until now, there were only three essential components of a true Brady violation: 1) the 
evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it 
is impeaching; 2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the state, either willfully or 
inadvertently; and 3) prejudice must have ensued. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. at 281-82. No 
requirement that the exculpatory nature of the evidence be apparent to the prosecution exists 
under Brady. All that is actually required is a showing that the evidence would have been 
favorable to the accused. That showing was made by Mr. Stevens. 
Kirkpatrick is an outlier case, inconsistent with the text and purpose of Brady and a case 
which no court - save this one - has relied upon in the nine years since its publication. It is also 
contrary to the well-established line of Idaho cases which follow Brady's holding that the good-
faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant. See, e.g., Ward, supra. (Perhaps the above is why the state 
did not even cite to Kirkpatrick in its brief.) Thus, this Court should grant rehearing to 
reconsider the case without reliance upon the erroneous ruling in Kirkpatrick. 
4. The withheld evidence is also impeaching. 
It is long-established that the duty under Brady "encompasses impeachment evidence as 
well as exculpatory evidence," Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280, citing United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S., at 676. And a serious break in the chain of custody for the eyes is plainly impeachment 
material. The evidence is also impeaching because it undermines Dr. Crawford's testimony 
about the macular folds because the eyes were not in the same condition as when Dr. Kent 
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examined them in situ. As noted above, Dr. Slaughter had been informed by two forensic 
pathologists that the eyes should be removed at the time of the autopsy. So, he knew that the 
failure to follow recommended medical protocol was impeaching. Further, no specialized 
medical knowledge was required for the members of the prosecution team to know the post-
embalming removal of the eyes was a procedural error which the defense was entitled to bring to 
the jury's attention in order to attack Dr. Crawford's testimony. This Court, however, failed to 
address the fact that the evidence was plainly impeaching under Brady. Thus, even if the Court 
was correct in concluding the evidence was not clearly exculpatory and consequently there was 
no duty to disclose such evidence, this Court still erred in denying the Brady claim because the 
evidence was impeaching. 
5. Conclusion. 
Brady was violated in this case because: 1) the prosecution team was in possession of the 
knowledge that the eyes had not been removed at the autopsy but rather had been removed post-
embalming, triggering the prosecutor's duty to disclose (even if the state was not aware of the 
exculpatory value of the evidence); 2) the evidence was exculpatory on its face because it 
provided an explanation as to why Dr. Kent did not see the macular folds when the child was 
alive when Dr. Crawford saw them post mortem; but even if it were not exculpatory or its 
exculpatory value was not apparent, 3) the evidence was obviously impeaching and was still 
required to be disclosed. The Court's conclusion that the embalming report need not have been 
disclosed because it was not in the possession of the prosecution team misses the Brady issue 
entirely. The embalming report is not the evidence which was withheld. Its conclusion that the 
evidence of the post-embalming removal was not plainly exculpatory is an unreasonable 
detennination of facts of the case. Its conclusion that the prosecutor must know about the 
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exculpatory value is contrary to Brady. And its failure to even consider that the evidence was 
impeaching is contrary to controlling Supreme Court precedent post-Brady. Accordingly, 
rehearing should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this l~'tday of January, 2014. 
~~~~'--
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Edward Stevens 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on January ~,2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 




to: Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
Office of the Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
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